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Editor's Note
by Padraig O'Malley
The failed coup in the USSR and its consequences: the collapse of communism,
the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the emergence of voracious ethnic
nationalisms in the form of newly proclaimed nation states; the civil war in a Yugo-
slavia that teeters on the brink of dissolution; the continuing rumblings of discontent
in a Czechoslovakia that is trying mightily to hold itself from falling apart, the shifting
patterns of realignment in much of Central and Eastern Europe— each of these
events seems to be counterintuitive in some fundamental sense. After all, hasn't the
world become a global marketplace? Hasn't interdependence become the catch cry of
the 1990s? Aren't nations acknowledging their mutual needs and interests and surren-
dering their sovereignty to transnational superstructures such as the European Com-
munity, the new paradigm?
Besides, almost all that happened in those tumultuous months occurred with a sud-
denness and completeness that defied analysis. In the end the old order didn't die a
slow, lingering death, it simply dropped dead. The transformation of Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe and the USSR mocked conventional shibboleths. Events caught us off
guard not only in their happening but in the manner of their happening: volumes of
exquisitely crafted theory, decades of arcane analysis, libraries of wisdom, multiplici-
ties of social models, and volumes of behavioral simulations were all found to be
woefully wanting. In the end, change had more to do with the undoing of the long-
suppressed aspirations of indigenous peoples; and because they were long repressed,
they were assumed to be nonexistent. In the postmodern world, "nationalism" was, well,
a dirty word. The virtues of diversity were, of course, extolled, for who would not extol
diversity as an expression of difference? But the flip side of diversity is division, which is
not so quick to be acknowledged because it is not so readily amenable to remedy.
Which brings us, in a roundabout way perhaps, to this issue of the New England
Journal ofPublic Policy. It is an eclectic mix. Its range and diversity, however, illumi-
nate one of the less considered aspects of public policy: the fact that policy itself,
despite the efforts of policy theorists, and on occasion policymakers and practitioners,
to invest it with the trappings of rational, scientific method, rarely if ever is defined in
politically or culturally neutral terms. The pretense that this is not so suggests that
there exists some set of objective criteria that are impervious to either political or cul-
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tural dictates. In reality, of course, nothing could be further from the truth; policy is
the product of our particular circumstances, of the normative yardsticks and values
that imbue our political and cultural discourse, often with unforeseen impacts on and
dislocations to its intended beneficiaries. In short, we often kill or at the very least
maim with kindness.
In his reflective essay, "Professing American Literature: A Report from Brazil,"
Arnold Gordenstein, who taught American literature at a Brazilian university, makes
this point. "My own academic politics, a blend of old liberalism and 1960s radicalism,
constituted a cultural imperialism of its own," he says. "I made certain choices in my
teaching that were meaningful to me but . . .less meaningful to my students." Accord-
ingly, he developed courses "that privileged texts by the underdogs and the minorities"
and presented them "as free from assumptions about manifest destiny." "I tried to
suggest," he writes, "an approach to the Brazilians' own racial and sexual problems by
indirectness and by modeling, by displaying the United States, warts and all, and then
the U.S. response, warts and all."
Brazilian students, however, were unwilling to aspire to the American dream and
unable to see the social dimensions of the failure portrayed in the books Gordenstein
had selected for study. "My Brazilian students," he observes wryly, "usually did not see
the fates of these fictional characters as socially resonant catastrophes but mainly as
personal disappointments"— the values these "canons" of education "once repre-
sented in the United States were never assumed in Brazil." In a culture like that of
Brazil, "where you begin with a more relaxed and tolerant attitude to individual foibles
based on a deeper skepticism about the possibilities of social improvement through a
chronically, almost acceptably corrupt central government, the largest discernible
values have to do with family and blood loyalties." In short, Brazilian life and litera-
ture, he concludes, reflect "a flight from social issues to a concern for smaller nuclei
like the family." In the end, Gordenstein comes to a disturbing realization: the easy
socially conscious assumptions he brought to his work were an anathema to the
authoritarian military regime, noteworthy for its murderous excesses, which ruled the
country: "I had been encouraging catastrophe. For if my students absorbed and acted
on Thoreau in the way I was suggesting, they might land not in Concord jail but in an
unmarked grave."
Gordenstein's larger thesis— that the values at the core of our cultural composition
cannot easily be universalized— is the implicit theme of three other essays— Sharlene
Voogd Cochrane's "Compelled to Speak: Women Confronting Institutional Racism,
1910-1950," Paul L. Atwood's "The Vietnam War Memorial and the Gulf War," and
Richard A. Hogarty's "Searching for a UMass President: Transitions and Leaderships,
1970-1991."
Cochrane's article is close in form to a case study. She explores the efforts by women
both within and outside the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) to make
the organization confront its own racism. Her focus is the Boston YWCA and she
unfolds the study by drawing on the experiences of Lucy Miller Mitchell, the first
woman of color to be elected to the Boston YWCA board. The YWCA moved more
quickly than other similar institutions to shed its racism. One important reason for
this, Cochrane contends, was "the power of women speaking out in an institution that
encouraged them to make connections between their faith and their daily lives."
Their strategy, writes Cochrane, "was a profound commitment to connecting talk and
action. They kept issues alive and raised points at every opportunity. They constantly
set a context for and educated others to see the connections between YWCA rhetoric,
ideals, and practices." This sense of being compelled to act gave women an intensity, a
fervor, which overcame other powerful cultural messages of racism and silence and
gave them a clarity of purpose and courage to act. Their voicing of the moral argu-
ment was "unending, coherent, and powerful."
Some of Cochrane's data makes painfully clear the extent and scope of racism in
institutional form that set the context for race relations in Boston: no students of color
were allowed to live in any of Boston's college dormitories until the 1920s; women of
color looking for lodging in Boston in the late twenties were denied access to the
YWCA. In the words of one of its board's presidents: "It is part of our job to fit the
girl into the proper environment." For women of color that meant boarding in private
homes because "we [the board] believe they will be happiest among colored people";
no nursing schools or hospitals accepted women of color for nurses' training until
1929; and the YWCA swimming pool was not open to all women of color until the
1940s. Who are we to throw the first stone at South Africa?
Paul Atwood discusses the debate over the "meaning" of the Vietnam War Memo-
rial in Washington, D.C., and relates this to the revision of the "Vietnam syndrome" as
it has been played out in recent U.S. armed interventions overseas. Considerable polit-
ical struggle over precisely which values the monument should enshrine occurred
during the design phase of the memorial. Some proponents wished for a contempla-
tive, antiwar message, while others believed the memorial should embody traditional
martial themes. This division, Atwood argues, continued and extended the debate
over the Vietnam War itself. The issue in the Gulf, Atwood postulates, was substan-
tially the same as in Indochina— the United States attempted to foster its hegemony
in both regions, to protect its dominance from indigenous threats, and to promote the
continued rule of native elites friendly to U.S. interests. Throughout the eighties,
Atwood contends, substantial cultural productions helped to erase the real memories
of the tragedy and divisiveness of the war by "normalizing" the Vietnam veteran and
portraying his role in standard heroic terms, thereby assisting in the manufacture of a
new public consensus that employment of military options should be subject to the
"will to win," the use of maximum firepower, and an "acceptable" number of U.S.
casualties. This "historical and cultural revisionism," he says, "contributed to public
willingness to employ devastating force against Grenada, Panama, and Iraq."
Richard Hogarty's article on presidential searches is a sequel to his essay "The
Search for a Massachusetts Chancellor: Autonomy and Politics in Higher Education"
(New England Journal ofPublic Policy 4, no. 2). In his current article, he examines the
tension between cultural constructs and value systems in a context that juxtaposes
the pristine requirements of the academy and the pragmatic demands of the polity.
Hogarty quotes from Choosing a College President: Opportunities and Constraints, a
seminal study of presidential searches by Judith Block McLaughlin and David Riesman:
"Like perhaps no other event in the life of an institution, the search for a president
reveals the politics, protocols, and promise of the American academic enterprise."
They might also have added "and the cultural relativism of the major players in the
selection procedure."
Reviewing five presidential searches that have taken place at the University of
Massachusetts since 1970, Hogarty concludes that "because of the culture of the state,
the search becomes political, no matter what committee structure or procedural safe-
guards are employed. Consequently, the key to a successful search depends to a large
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extent on the 'representativeness' of the process and the participation of all parties-
at-interest. For the search to be considered legitimate," Hogarty concludes, "it must
include the major stakeholders within the university community." Exclusion of faculty
members from search committees frequently causes antagonism to the searches.
"Such antagonism tends to generate suspicion and mistrust, which in turn undermine
the effectiveness of the incumbent."
John C. Berg looks at value structures in a different framework in what he calls
"Beyond the Party-Group Continuum." Studies in the 1960s found that Massachusetts
was a state with strong parties and weak interest groups. In the 1970s and 1980s, as the
Republican Party shrank, party competition declined, conflict within the Democratic
Party grew, and interest groups became more important— and will probably remain
important, Berg suggests, despite the Republican gains of 1990. However, while inter-
est groups are now much stronger than the parties, they do not dominate Massachu-
setts politics. They are kept from doing so not by the parties, but by intergroup conflict.
Interest groups, according to Berg, "are a big and growing business in Massachu-
setts." The number of registered lobbyists continues to rise, as do both interest-group
spending and campaign contributions. Until 1990, Massachusetts seemed to be grow-
ing more and more similar to a traditional one-party state, with the Democrats hold-
ing a dominant electoral position but with little or no coherence on policy issues. As in
the old one-party South, this made interest groups more and more important as the
organizing force in policymaking.
But Massachusetts, says Berg, differs from the old one-party states of the South in
that it has strong labor unions, environmental organizations, women's groups, and
grassroots groups such as MassPIRG. These interest groups are not strong enough,
singly or collectively, he posits, to overcome the economic weight and political power
of the state's businesses, but they are strong enough to prevent the development of the
kind of single-interest business dominance common in the Old South and West. More-
over, there are also important divisions within the business community. The situation
in Massachusetts, therefore, might better be characterized as one of interest-centered
conflict rather than interest-group dominance.
Bruce Wundt outlines the consequences and policy implications of the large cuts in
defense expenditures on the economy of Connecticut. That state's economy enjoyed
considerable prosperity during the 1980s as a result of its reliance on the defense
industry. Now that defense expenditure is being cut back, Connecticut is faced with
the task of diversifying into new markets and products. Two industries in particular—
aircraft and aircraft parts and ship- and boat-building— have averaged greater than
21 percent of total manufacturing employment in Connecticut during the twenty-three
years between 1964 and 1987. In contrast countrywide, these industries account for
about 4.2 percent of total U.S. manufacturing employment. When the multiplier
impact of these two industries on output and employment is taken into account, these
two industries either directly or indirectly account for one in four jobs in Connecticut.
Furthermore, a one percent reduction in employment in these two crucial industries
will result in a four tenths of one percent drop in total manufacturing employment.
For the entire 1964-1987 period, total manufacturing employment in Connecticut
fell; however, increasing federal expenditures on defense and its concomitant impact
on employment in defense-related industries, particularly from 1977 on, largely offset
this loss so that employment fluctuations were relatively mild. Correspondingly, in
recent years the state has experienced greater instability in manufacturing employ-
ment. The implications for policymakers, says Wundt, are that Connecticut should not
direct its efforts toward replacing the defense industry with another dominant indus-
try. Rather, the state must encourage the expansion of industries that would not only
increase the manufacturing base but also provide stability in employment. Given this
objective, he suggests that state policymakers focus their efforts on promoting the
expansion of industries that are compatible with the state's economic structure, such
as certain medical instruments, printing, chemicals, and textiles and apparel industries.
"Representativeness" is also the theme of Shaun O'Connell's essay, "Representa-
tive Men." Reviewing six books, one about an actual man and five about fictional men,
O'Connell sees them as attempts to define "representative men" of the 1980s, "an
era," he observes, "when the worst were full of passionate intensities, particularly
among men." Each antiheroic man in these books, he concludes, was "selfish, domi-
neering, dangerous to women, and deceitful, yet each man was also committed to a
system of values and ideas that made him an interesting case history— values which,
in some instances, redeemed his failings."
As usual, O'Connell, in his understated way, challenges us to relate literary
and cultural values to public policy issues, and, as usual, they invariably illuminate the
elastic dimensions of public policy with more clarity than more rigid socioeconomic
dogmas.***
